then was of each division of the Chinese and Japanese armies. Except in the areas of Nanning and in the north-west around Wunnan there has not been any marked change since that date, and any change that has occurred has on balance been in favour of China. I had realised that the Japanese were in occupation of only a comparatively small area around the main cities in East and East-Central China and along the railways and trunk roads connecting them, but I had not realised how great were the areas that were still in the occupation of the Central Government around and behind the Japanese lines. From the point of view of area at least five-sixths of the whole of China must still be in Chinese occupation.
28. The Chinese forces are made up of three categories: The Central Government's regular army, part of which is operating as mobile forces; the two Communist armies, one in the north-west (the old VIIIth Route Army) and one around Nanking (the IVth Route Army); the partisans or guerrilla troops, who take their orders from the nearest regular troops, which may happen to be Communist or Central Government. In addition to these there are the Defence Corps, which consist of practically every male inhabitant in the areas behind the Japanese lines. They are organised to defend their own villages from Japanese raids but do not go outside their own immediate area to fight. I append a state- ment(*) taken from the notes of my interview with General Ho dealing with the strength of the Central Government troops, from my talk with Communist representatives, so far as the Communist army is concerned, and a report given to me by a young Englishman who had walked one thousand miles from Peking through the north-eastern territory behind the Japanese lines. These notes(2) I reproduce in full as they have other points of interest. They were considerably elaborated in a long conversation I had with the writer.
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29. The Chinese army is incapable, because of the lack of heavy arms, of staging any large-scale attack upon Japanese entrenched positions. The Japanese however, can, by concentration of such material, capture any specific position they desire, provided they can maintain their lines of communication. Chinese therefore rely very largely upon mobile or guerrilla warfare, and the cutting off of the Japanese when they advance too far ahead of their heavy artillery. The successes of the mobile units and partisans are very considerable and are reported practically every day in the communiqués issued in Chungking, though no account of them ever appears in the Japanese press. I made careful enquiries as to the reliability of these Chungking reports and ascertained that in substance they were correct, though no reliance can be placed upon the actual figures of dead and wounded, which are merely estimates and almost certainly tend to be optimistic. The toll on the Japanese forces from this method of warfare must be very considerable, since the Japanese losses resulting are certainly as great, and in many instances probably greater than the Chinese. The Chinese express themselves as completely confident of ultimate victory from the military point of view, though they realise that they will be unable to drive the Japanese out of their entrenched positions by direct attack. From a superficial examination, which was all that I was able to make, it would seem that they are justified in these expectations, provided they do not allow some major catastrophe to occur through the carelessness or inefficiency of their generalship. The taking of Nanning, for instance, was, according to the Chinese staff, due to a major blunder by the general in command of that area. He had positioned his troops for a landing at Pakhoi, without regard to the possibilities of a landing further west, where in fact it took place. The other danger is of the breakdown of transport, through lack of gasoline or inefficiency in transport organisation. So far as man-power is concerned, this is being continually recruited and there are still inexhaustible supplies.
30. The latest news from the various fronts when I left Chungking was considered satisfactory, though the Generalissimo took the view that the Chinese offensive at Nanning had not been conducted as efficiently as it should have been, since in his opinion the Japanese ought to have been driven out altogether. Í had a talk with the Governor of Kansu when at Lanchow, who had just returned from conducting operations on the north-west front, and he expressed himself as fully satisfied with the then recent victories around Wayun. Indeed, he said that he fervently hoped that the Japanese would send up more troops and renew their attacks, as he considered the terrain so favourable to the Chinese army that they were bound to inflict further heavy losses on the Japanese.
(2) Not printed.
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